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Paust: Tolerance in the Age of Increased Interdependence

TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF INCREASED INTERDEPENDENCE
JordanJ Paust"
For several reasons, I hope that you will be a relatively tolerant reader.
I am not sure that I can offer insights that an experienced psychiatrist or
sensitive moral philosopher might lend to a discussion of love, loyalty,
nationalism, patriotism, and what most assuredly fosters respect for the
dignity of other human beings as opposed to human indignity and its many
unacceptable and criminal consequences. In my opinion, a capacity for
love and a general tolerance of others are quite important. Thus, I tend to
agree with Viet Dinh that when we love, we tend to love locally, and that
love within a family can form a base for love, or at least respect and
tolerance, of others locally, nationally, and universally.' It also seems
apparent that "[1liberal democracy requires a healthy dose of mutual
commitment"2 and sharing. Perhaps these qualities relate even to a liberal
being as opposed to one who is withdrawn, isolated, and prone to anger,
if not violence.
I hesitate, however, when presented with alleged postulates such as
"loving our country ...

allows us (indeed requires us) to love others

more" 3 and

"[1] oyalty to our nation.., fosters a commitment to universal
principles,"4 assuming that Professor Dinh means preferable principlesfor example, those commonly associated with the advancement of human
dignity.5 What, indeed, is the full meaning of preferable patriotism or love
of country?
I wonder, for example, whether Lieutenant William Calley6 had a
normal capacity for love (or even a normal or healthy love of his country).
I also wonder whether love of and loyalty to the United States assure that
United States soldiers will not murder captured and defenseless

* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston.

1. Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REv. 867, 878 (2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 879.
5. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A
Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145 (1984) (exploring the
Supreme Court's use of the concept and suggesting prescriptive approaches to integrating human
dignity in international and United States constitutional law).
6. See Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding Lieutenant
Calley's conviction for the premeditated murder of at least twenty-two Vietnamese civilians during
the Vietnam War); United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R. 1973) (upholding
Lieutenant Calley's conviction and denying a new trial), aff'd, 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973).
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Vietnamese women and children,7 or that they will not torture8 captured
Arab or Muslim men in Iraq or elsewhere.9 Did patriotism and loyalty to

7. Calley, 519 F.2d at 189.
8. By focusing on torture, I do not.mean to imply that cruel treatment and inhumane
treatment are permissible. In fact, in addition to torture, human rights law prohibits "cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment." See, e.g., InternationalCovenant on Civil andPoliticalRights, art. 7, G.A.
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter
ICCPR]. The law of war prohibits the same forms of treatment. See, e.g., Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 288-90 (requiring that "[plersons taking no active part in the
hostilities ... shall in all circumstances be treated humanely" and prohibiting "mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture" and "[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment"); id. at art. 5 (requiring that such persons be "treated with humanity"); id. at
art. 27 (requiring "respect for their persons, their honour" and that "[t]hey shall at all times be
humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and
against insults and public curiosity"); id. at art. 31 ("No physical or moral coercion shall be
exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them.. . ."); id. at art.
32 (prohibiting contracting parties "from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the
physical suffering ... of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to
murder, torture, corporal punishment, [and] mutilation..., but also to any other measures of
brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents"); id. at art. 33 (prohibiting "all measures
of intimidation"); id. at art. 147 (including among "[girave breaches" such conduct as "torture or
inhuman treatment,... wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health").
Concerning criminal prosecution, see generally Jordan Paust, Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu
Ghraib: Will Prosecutionand Cashieringof a Few Soldiers Comply with InternationalLaw?, at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/paustl.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) (discussing official
responsibility for military human rights abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad).
9. See, e.g., MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 16-19 (2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/
prison abuse report.pdf (detailing abuses that military personnel perpetrated on prisoners held in
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq); John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004,
at 26; Raymond Bonner et al., Questioning Terror Suspects in a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, § 1, at 1; Julian Borger, Harsh Methods Approved at Top, GUARDIAN
(London), May 12, 2004, at 13; Jess Bravin, PentagonReport Set Frameworkfor Use of Torture,
WALL ST. J., June 7,2004, at Al; Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May
10, 2004, at 42, availableat http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?0405 Ofa .fact; IraqiGeneral
Dies in American Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2003, at A26; Vernon Loeb, Army Fines Officer
for FiringPistol nearIraqi Detainee, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2003, at A 18; Patrick J. McDonnell
et al., Report on IraqiPrisonFound 'Systemic and llegalAbuse, 'L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2004, at Al;
The Nightmare at Abu Ghraib,N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2004, at A22; Dana Priest & Joe Stephens,
Harsh Actions Okayed by US. Officials, TORONTO STAR, May 9, 2004, at A7; Dana Priest & Joe
Stephens, Secret World of US. Interrogation:Long History of Tactics in Overseas Prisons Is
Coming to Light, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at Al; Carol Rosenberg, Few Details in IraqAbuse
Case: US. Army Shields Soldiers Charged: 4 More GIs Killed, Prrr. POST-GAzETTE, Mar. 22,
2004, at A5; Eric Schmitt, Three Soldiers Are Chargedwith Assault on Prisoners,N.Y. TIES,
Nov. 19, 2003, at A10; Esther Schrader & Patrick J. McDonnell, Bush Denounces Troops'
Treatment of Prisoners,L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at Al; Esther Schrader & Greg Miller, US.
Officials Defend Interrogation Tactics, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2004, at Al 1; Thom Shanker &
Jacques Steinberg, Bush Voices 'Disgust' at Abuse of IraqiPrisoners,N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004,
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the United States protect United States citizens of Japanese ancestry from
being publicly humiliated, mistreated, and sent to concentration camps by
those within our military who acted in the name of patriotism and loyalty,
and to whom a compliant majority of the United States Supreme Court
deferred?' ° Did love of country contribute to the creation of racist land
at Al; Ken Silverstein, US. MilitaryLawyers Felt 'Shut Out' of Prison Policy, L.A. TIMEs, May
14,2004, at AIO; US. MilitaryCharges6 in Probe ofPrisonerAbuses, Cn. TRIB., Mar. 21,2004,
at 4; James Warren, Hersh'sNew Yorker Article a ChillingAccount of Torture,CFH. TRIB., May 3,
2004, Tempo section, at 2; Gary Younge, US Soldiers Sent Home for Beating Prisonersof War,
GuARDIAN (London), Jan. 6, 2004, at 17; Jordan Paust, The Common Plan to Violate the Geneva
Conventions paras.1, 3, 8, at http:l/jurislaw.pitt.edulforum/paust2.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2004)
(discussing evidence that the Bush Administration planned to violate the Geneva Conventions
concerning detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan) [hereinafter The Common Plan].
The alleged war crimes can be prosecuted by the United States in federal district courts as well
as in military courts-martial, see supra note 6, or certain military commissions. War crimes
committed by military, former military, or civilian persons can be prosecuted in general courtmartial under 10 U.S.C. § 818, which incorporates by reference offenses against the laws of war as
offenses against the laws of the United States. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000); see 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2000)
(allowing federal district courts at least concurrent jurisdiction over such offenses and any other
offenses against the laws of the United States); Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946)
(discussing the jurisdiction of military tribunals); United States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. I,
26-30 (1942) (discussing the jurisdiction of military tribunals); Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai: The
Casefor War Crime Jurisdictionover Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEx. L. REv. 6
(1971-72) (arguing that federal district courts have jurisdiction over civilians in war crime cases).
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 covers "grave breach[es]" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
violations of common Article 3 thereof, if committed by or against a United States national. 18
U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2003); see United States ex rel. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27-28 ("From the very
beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part
of the law of nations which prescribes.., the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as
of enemy individuals.").
10. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19, 223 (1944). In Korematsu, the
Court held:
[E]xclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary because of the
presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group, most of
was impossible to
whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country.. . . [I]t
bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal ....
...Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility
to him or his race. He was excluded because we [were] at war with the Japanese
Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities . . . decided
that... all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated.

Id.; see id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt is the case of convicting a citizen as a punishment
for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely
because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good
disposition ....). Justice Murphy claimed that the exclusion "falls into the ugly abyss of racism."
Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). He further stated that "the exclusion, either temporarily or
permanently, of all persons with Japanese blood in their veins has no such reasonable
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laws in California," or laws to keep out the "'yellow horde""' 2 and stave
off the "'yellow peril,"".' 3 or to the racist immigration laws passed by
Congress, in the words of a nationalistic Supreme Court, to exclude the
"vast hordes" from our shores? 4 Are members of the Ku Klux Klan
relatively patriotic and conservative, or relatively cosmopolitan and
liberal? Would loyalty and patriotism, as understood by Professor Dinh,
require deference to President Bush with respect to the forced
disappearance of thousands of persons detained at Guantanamo and
elsewhere after September 11, in violation of international law? Or would
they require deference to "universal principles" enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and various human rights treaties? 5
relation .... This forced exclusion was the result in good measure of... racial guilt." Id. at 235
(Murphy, J., dissenting). He further described the exclusion aimed at individuals "whose 'racial
strains are undiluted,"' as a "blanket condemnation of all persons of Japanese descent." Id. at 236
(Murphy, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Murphy stated that "to infer that examples of
individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against the entire
group is to deny that under our system of law individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of
rights." Id. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (referencing a California land law
that forbade aliens ineligible for American citizenship from owning property).
12. See id. at 661 (Murphy, J., concurring).
13. See id. at 658, 668 (Murphy, J., concurring).
14. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("If... the government ....
through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this
country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion
[is permissible]."). In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court stated:
large numbers of Chinese laborers, of a distinct race and religion, remaining
strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to the
customs and usages of their own country, unfamiliar with our institutions, and
apparently incapable of assimilating with our people, might endanger good order,
and be injurious to the public interests ....
149 U.S. 698, 717 (1893). See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and
the Administrative State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing the role of the federal
Asian exclusion policy in the development of administrative law); Louis Henkin, The Constitution
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 853 (1987) (discussing the Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny and racism in light of the
constitutional power to regulate immigration); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Plenary Power Doctrine:
SubvertingHuman Rights in the Name ofSovereignty, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1115 (2002) (providing
an overview of the application of the plenary power doctrine in United States jurisprudence and
considering its implications for United States compliance with international law).
15. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/Il Overreaction and FallaciesRegarding War and
Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, JudicialReview of Detention, and Due
Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1346-53 (2004) (demonstrating
that international human rights laws apply to persons detained by the United States in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Guantanomo Bay, Cuba); see also Dinh,supra note 1,at 878 ("'We believe in the dignity
and rights of every person ... ' (quoting President George W. Bush's Remarks at a "Saluting Our
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Indeed, should persons within the Administration who participated in a
common plan to violate the law deserve the loyalty of any human being?
More generally, does patriotic loyalty assure the creation or enhancement
of liberal democracy and the liberal being?
Moreover, what if the state is not the United States, but Hitler's
Germany, the Stalinist Soviet Union, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the
apartheid regime in South Africa, Milosevic's Yugoslavia, Saddam
Hussein's Iraq, or the present dictatorships in North Korea and Zimbabwe?
Would love of country and loyalty to the state in such settings foster
human dignity and degrade terrorism? As an international law professor,
I know that such forms of love and loyalty would not be defenses to
international crime. 6 From a psychological perspective, however, were
those who served or still 7serve the evils of human indignity in such states
"rudderless person[s]"?" Or, did they have 'shared experiences and
cooperative activity"' that allowed them to participate in "'a process of
association and mutuality, the ongoing character of which ... claims to
protect against external encroachment ' "18 and "'have common glories in
the past and.., have a common will[,] ... a grand solidarity, constituted
by the sentiment of sacrifices"'? 19 Do many non-state terrorists share
experiences and engage in associational processes similar to those of the
state actor terrorists noted above? Did non-state Catholics and Protestants
in Northern Ireland? Do bin Laden and his associates?2 °
Viet Dinh seems to assume that what clearly distinguishes preferable
associational experiences that foster human dignity from those that do not
is patriotism that is territorially based, a love and loyalty to a state.2 '
Whatever love and loyalty drives bin Laden and a growing number of
Islamic extremists across continents who kill infidels without any putative
non-religious distinction is admittedly not based in a single state. However,
from the few examples of allegedly loyal, nationalistic, and patriotic state

Veterans" Celebration in Ripley, West Virginia, 38 WEEKLY CoM. PRES. Doc. 1138, 1139 (July
4, 2002))).
16. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 28 (2d ed. 2000).

17. Dinh, supra note 1, at 879.
18. Id. at 876 (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 54 (2d ed. 1992)).

19. Id. (quoting Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? (Ida Mae Snyder trans.), in
NATIONALISM 17, 17 (John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith eds., 1994)).
20. Would it be understandable if bin Laden had given the following speech: We have
"'never been united by blood or birth or soil. We are bound by ideals that move us beyond our
backgrounds, lift us above our interests and teach us what it means to be' loyal patriots of Islam?
But cf id. at 876-77 (quoting President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, I PUB. PAPERS 1, 1
(Jan. 20, 2001)).
21. Professor Dinh qualifies this in some indeterminate way, preferring not just absolute
loyalty to the state, "[b]ut loyalty there must be, even in dissent." Id. at 877. Why must there be
"loyalty," and to what extent if less than "absolute," are not demonstrated.
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actor terrorists noted above, it is evident that patriotism with a territorial
base provides no assurance of preferred outcomes and effects. Some who
follow bin Laden proclaim their love and loyalty to an Islamic nation.
Would their terroristic tactics against any who disagree be abandoned if the
Islamic nation that they prefer had a single territorial base and if they were
generally free from outside intervention? Indeed, would use of terroristic
tactics disappear if their extremist nation was global and generally in
power?
It seems that more than territoriality is involved. In fact, territorial
enclaves within a state, region, or global community can also foster
unhealthy distinctions between "them" and "us" and can deflate what
seems to be at least as important as a capacity for love-a general tolerance
of "the others."22 Clearly, racist, ideologically intolerant, and religiously
intolerant love of groups, loyalty, and patriotism are insufficient.3 Perhaps
a healthy tolerance of others is even a necessary aspect of a healthy
capacity for love.24 I prefer the phrase "general tolerance" because
tolerance of intolerance is not always preferable, nor is nonintervention.
Lines are sometimes difficult to draw between tolerance that is and is not
preferable. The same pertains to preferred commitment and intervention by
diplomatic, political, economic, and physical means. Yet, there are often
generally shared legal expectations or cores of normative content that
provide the legally trained with a basis for choice concerning the legal
limits of tolerance and the permissibility of intervention.
The claimed desirability of reactive parochialism, primacy of the
supposedly autonomous state, and nonintervention in an age of increased
and growing interdependence (what Professor Dinh postulates as an age of
terror), raise other issues of concern that pose points of disagreement.
Professor Dinh's argument in this regard confuses "state" with "nation,, 25
22. See JONATHAN SACKS, THEDIGNrrYOFDIFFERENCE 45-46(2002) (discussing the dangers

of differentiating between them and us). International crimes such as forced disappearance, torture,
war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity can thrive on labels of "the others" that
dehumanize. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader
Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 163 n.241 (1972) (regarding the 1864 Sand Creek massacre of
Cheyenne by Colonel Chivington and his "3rd Colorado volunteers"). Particularly threatening is
the label "illegal" alien, because it assumes that a person is illegal beyond what the person
supposedly has done in violation of immigration laws. No human being is "illegal." See Paust,
supra note 5, at 191-94 & n.207.
23. Professor Dinh offers the recognition that a preferred loving of"those close to us" "does
not mean that we can disrespect" others. Dinh, supra note 1, at 878.
24. See Paust, supra note 5, at 170 n. 115 (discussing various theorists who emphasize "a
balanced emphasis on liberty and responsibility"). Further, "[h]uman dignity, as a process, is
compatible with enlightened self-interest and an affirmative, optimistic involvement, a love, of self
and others." Id. at 225. Love of self coupled with love of others stand in opposition to what is often
the arrogant myth of terrorists and totalitarians.
25. A "nation" is not the same as a "state." A nation is a recognizable group of people that
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and it appears to rest on ahistorical assumptions that there exists a
supposed "monopoly on force of nation-states" and that a "central lesson
of September 11 [is] that nation-states no longer have a monopoly on the
motives and means of war."26 However, under international law the
participants in "war" have long included states, nations, belligerents,27 and
insurgents.2 8 Thus, clearly, the state has never had a monopoly on the use
of force or the motives and means ofwar. Additionally, armed violence not
amounting to war or even insurgency has often been engaged in by
nonstate actors,29 including nineteenth and twentieth century anarchists
unmoored from geography, ° and transnational terrorists." Moreover,32
terrorism, whether in times of relative peace or war, certainly is not new.
need not have a territorial base or a governmental structure. See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 118-19 (5th ed. 1955) (recognizing that "asingle state... may include many nations, or
a single nation may be dispersed among many states"); JORDAN J.PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND LITIGATION INTHE U.S. 7 (2000); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
26-27 (George Grafton Wilson ed., Clarendon Press 1936) (1866) (distinguishing between anation
and a state). Further, a nation can have treaty relations and responsibilities even though it is not a
state. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 4, 32 (1899) (granting rights to certain lands to a
nation as well as to Chief Moose Dung and other named persons); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S.
711, 724-25, 746, 749, 755 (1835) (holding that the Spain-Indian treaty and rights thereunder
remained in force when the United States acquired the Floridas); 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 249 (1873)
(granting jurisdiction to a military commission regarding convictions of certain Modoc Indians for
violations of the laws of war), See generally Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous
Peoples: A Global Comparative and InternationalLegal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.57
(1999) (discussing the status of indigenous groups within various states).
26. Dinh, supra note 1, at 869.
27. "Belligerents" in a civil war are not the equivalent of "states"; during the American civil
war, Great Britain, other European states, and the United States recognized the Confederate States
of America, not as a state, but as a belligerent for purposes of trade, laws of neutrality, and the laws
of war. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 666-67, 669 (1862).
28. Concerning criteria for an insurgency and applicable laws of war during an insurgency,
see, for example, PAUSTETAL.,supra note 16, at 809, 812-13, 815-16, 819, 831-32.
29. See generally Jordan J.Paust, Private Measures of Sanction, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 575 (Alona E. Evans & John F. Murphy eds., 1978) (discussing the
legalities of private citizens imposing private sanctions against terrorism); W. Michael Reisman,
PrivateArmies in a Global War System: Prologueto Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973-1974)
(discussing private armies in the international context).
30. See, e.g., Clarence J. Mann, Personnel and Property of Transnational Business
Operations, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 29, at 406; Jordan J.
Paust, A Survey ofPossibleLegal Responses to InternationalTerrorism:Prevention, Punishment,
and CooperativeAction, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 431, 448-50 (1975).
31. See generally INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (Yonah Alexander ed., 1976) (discussing
international terrorism generally); INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES (M. Cherif

Bassiouni ed., 1975) (compiling papers presented at an
political crimes).
32. See, e.g., Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey,
secret labor organizations that engage in terrorism);
terroristic publications); Ireland v. United Kingdom,
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Why would one conclude, then, that our living generations are in a "new
era, the Age of Terror"?33 And why should September 11 "define our
domestic
and foreign policy"?34 Indeed, applying the rhetoric and labels of
"war '" and "combatant" when international law does not (for example, in
contexts where social violence is less than an insurgency), can be policythwarting and dangerous. 3
In any event, acceptance of dangerous "war" rhetoric and a specious
need to allow September 11 to "define our domestic and foreign policy" is
not necessary in order to address Professor Dinh's final three
recommendations.36 It is certainly not necessary to accept Professor Dinh' s
preferences that states realize their collective interests and obligations to
combat terrorism, and that universal jurisdiction pertains, because the
international community has already made these recognitions, and did so
prior to September 11.31 Importantly, the international community also

(recognizing that "terrorist activities.., of individuals or of groups ...are in clear disregard of
human rights"); EUGENE VICTOR WALTER, TERROR AND RESISTANCE: A STUDY OF POLmcAL
VIOLENCE (1969) (discussing the history of terror as a political tool); Jordan J. Paust, An

Introductionto andCommentary on Terrorismand the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. 697 (1987); Jordan
J. Paust, Terrorism and the InternationalLaw of War, 64 MI. L. REV. 1, 11-17, 32, 36 (1974).
33. See Dinh, supra note 1, at 869.
34. Compare id. at 867 with Paust, supra note 15, at 1336-40.
35. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 15, at 1342; Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After
9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 326-28 (2003). Concerning other
dangers posed by the common plan of the Bush Administration to violate law when interrogating
alleged terrorists and others and its "war" rhetoric, see, for example, supra note 9.
36. See Dinh, supra note 1, at 880-81 (recommending stronger enforcement of immigration
laws, tighter control of borders, and greater international commitments to help weak nations).
37. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339 (2000) (designating terrorism as a crime); United
States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that universal jurisdiction
is increasingly applied to terrorist actors); Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 56/160, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/160 (2002) (reaffirming the United Nations Condemnation
of terror acts); Measuresto EliminateInternationalTerrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR, 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 303, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/49/Annex (1994); InternationalConventionfor
the Suppressionof the Financingof Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/154/615 (1999); InternationalConventionfor the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc. A/52/653 (1998);
Measuresto EliminateInternationalTerrorism,G.A. Res. 46/5 1, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., paras. 1,
3-4, U.N. Doc. A/46/654 (1991) (stating that the Secretary General's report "[o]nce again
unequivocally condemns, as criminal and unjustifiable, all acts, methods and practices ofterrorism
wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize the friendly relations
among States and their security"); G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 301,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985); S.C. Res. 579, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., Res. And Decs., at 24, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/41 (1985); PAUST ET AL., supra note 16, at 995, 1002, 1005-07, 1012; sources cited
supra note 32. Concerning civil sanctions under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, see, for example, Boim v.
Quranic Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d 1000, 1003, 1028 (7th Cir. 2002) (dismissing suit against
organizations that allegedly fundraise for Hamas), and Klinghoffer v. S.N. C.Achille Lauro EdAltriGestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria,937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir.
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recognized legal obligations of states to bring into custody those
reasonably accused of committing customary and treaty-based international
crimes, including impermissible terrorism, and to initiate prosecution of or
extradition of such persons.3" Obligations already exist to provide
opportunities for civil sanctions against such persons with respect to
underlying human rights violations,39 and civil sanctions can aid overall
efforts to combat terrorism.
The fallacies of "autonomous" states, a ban on all forms of intervention,
and a "world ordered by sovereign states ' present other points of
disagreement. We live in a time of increasing interdependence and
transnational interaction with respect to all sectors of public life,4
including trade and investment, energy, organized crime, law enforcement,
banking, politics, the world wide web, and other forms of access to
knowledge and communication, such as news media, intelligence
gathering, education, culture, religion, entertainment, transportation,
leisure, food and agriculture, the environment, health, employment, human
invention, and exploration of space. Each year, tens of millions of United
States citizens travel or work abroad, and tens of millions of other persons
come to the United States. Among the many other nonstate participants in
various geographically unmoored sectors of public life are multinational
corporations,42 organized criminal entities, and religious entities that can
sometimes wield more wealth and power than most states, and that might
even control some states. Other potentially significant nonstate participants
in economic, diplomatic, enlightenment, and political processes include
trade organizations, international and regional intergovernmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and various media. Most
sectors of the practice of law in major cities within the United States are
also increasingly unmoored by geography. No first year law school course,
and hardly any "bar course" or specialty course, is without its transnational

1991) (finding that the court could decide whether the Palestine Liberation Organization could be
sued because, among other things, the Legislative branch had already expressly endorsed the
concept of "suing terrorist organizations" in federal court under § 2333).
38. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The Link Between Human Rights and Terrorism and Its
Implicationsfor the Law ofState Responsibility, IIHAST. INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 41, 51-53 (19871988); Paust, supra note 30, at 451-53.
39. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES 224-29

(2d ed. 2003); Paust, supra note 38, at 50-51, 54.
40. See Dinh, supra note 1, at 874.
41. See, e.g., LUNG-cHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

ix-x, 3-4, 23, 50-81 (2d ed. 2000); MYREs S. McDouGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 94-142, 161-248 (1980); Paust, supra note 29, at 601-04.
42. See generallyJordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations,
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801 (2002) (demonstrating that human rights law applies to private
corporations).
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and international legal elements. This is true regardless of whether law
schools adequately prepare, and state bar examiners adequately test, our
students for the changing practice of law.
An "absolute right of the sovereign" and "untrammeled" state
sovereignty43 were never real and always faced opposition." Today, they
are pipe dreams and are still not preferable, especially with respect to the
protection of customary and treaty-based human rights, prohibitions of
genocide and other crimes against humanity, and the control of terrorism.45
Within the United States, the very notion of sovereignty is one associated
with the primary authority of the people of the United States, and not the
state.46 This association is increasingly recognized in international law with

43. Dinh, supra note 1, at 871.
44. See, e.g., THOMAS BUERGENTHALETAL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INANUTSHELL
3-7 (3d ed. 2002); CHEN, supra note 41, at 314-17; RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 613-64 (3d ed. 1995); MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 41, at 18182,238-42,670; PAUST, supra note 39, at 12,61 n.97, 197-98,201-02,205,252 nn. 155-56; Jordan
J. Paust, The History,Nature, and Reach of the Alien Tort ClaimsAct, 16 FLA. J. INT'LL. 249, 255
n. 13 (2004) (addressing the widespread recognition among the Founders that in the eighteenth
century denials ofjustice to aliens could lead to armed reprisals and war). See generally G.A. Res.
39/2, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 14-15, U.N. Doc. A/39/2 (1984) (describing South
African apartheid as a threat to international peace and security and discussing the illegitimacy of
the South African regime); G.A. Res. 285, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 34, U.N. Doc. A/900 (1949)
(discussing Soviet refusals to allow wives of foreigners to emigrate); HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) (examining the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention and suggesting a stronger role for the United Nations); SEAN D.
MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER

(1996) (discussing the role of the United Nations in humanitarian intervention); FERNANDO R.
TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997)
(analyzing the permissibility of using force in humanitarian intervention); Michael J. Bazyler,
Reexamining the Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea
and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547 (1987) (suggesting criteria for governments to use in
deciding whether to intervene in cases where states perpetrate human rights violations).
45. See, e.g., Paust, supranote 30, at 455-56, 459-62; sources cited supranote 44. Professor
Dinh seems to recognize that violations of human rights "fall outside the limits of sovereignty."
Dinh, supra note 1, at 874. Human rights are indeed obligatioerga omnes (owing by and to all
humankind), and their violation is of universal concern; but Professor Dinh's focus on autonomous
states, nonintervention and protection against external encroachment, and loyalty to national
sovereignty and "nationalism" leave one wondering what the consequences ofhis preferences might
be in terms of a full, rich effectuation of human rights within the United States. The Founders and
Framers were certainly attentive to the need for such an effectuation of human rights. See, e.g.,
PAUST, supra note 39, at 195-203, 208-10, 323-26, 329-33. Professor Dinh's recognition of the
limiting role of human rights and "universal principles" may, however, offer an opening-if
"intervention" seems harsh, perhaps an opening for human interconnections and tolerance and a
more adequate fulfillment of human rights.
46. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the people"); U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("the people");
U.S. CONST. amend. X ("the people"); PAUST, supra note 39, at 54, 84, 127, 145, 186, 209, 220,
254, 257-58, 261, 286, 305-08, 328-35, 340, 342, 347-48, 351-53,356-57, 380,403, 487-88, 502.
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respect to self-determination of peoples (not states) 47 and the legitimacy of
governments under human rights law.48

47. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2; ICCPR, supra note 8, at
art. 1, para. I ("All peoples have the right... [to] freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development."); Promotion of a Democratic and
EquitableInternationalOrder,G.A. Res. 55/107, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 81 st plen. mtg., Agenda
Item 114(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/107 (2001); Declarationon Principlesof InternationalLaw
ConcerningFriendly Relations and Co-operationAmong States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 122, 123-24,
U.N. Doc. A/8028/Annex (1971); CHEN, supra note 41, at 30-33.
The Human Rights Committee created by the ICCPR also has recognized that "denying peoples
the right to determine their own political status ... would be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Covenant." U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., General Comment No. 24
para. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21i/Rev.i/Add.6 (1994). The Committee also has recognized that
"Article I ... imposes on all States parties corresponding obligations" and that "Paragraph 3 ...
imposes specific obligations . . . not only in relation to their own peoples but vis-A-vis all
peoples .... It follows that all States parties to the Covenant should take positive action to facilitate
realization of and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination." U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 21st Sess., General Comment No. 12 paras. 2, 6 (1984).
48. See, e.g., UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Supp. No. 13, at71, art. 21, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810(1948); see also 131 CONG. REC. S16,855-57
(Dec. 4, 1985) (statement of Jordan J. Paust) (arguing that the South African government during
apartheid was illegitimate); Document of the Copenhagen Meeting ofthe Conference on the Human
Dimension of the CSCE, July 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305 (stating a commitment to
"development of societies based on pluralistic democracy"); African (Banjul) Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 20, paras. 2-3, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5,21 I.L.M.
58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) (affirming the rights of oppressed peoples to free themselves);
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, pmbl., arts. 23,29,32, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(affirming the rights of citizens to participate in government and that an individual's rights are
limited by the rights of others); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2,
1948, arts. XX, XXVIII, O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprintedin Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.LN/II.82 doc. 6 rev. I at 25 (1992) (affirming the
right to participate in government and that an individual's rights are limited by others' rights).
CHEN, supra note 41, at 33 (affirming the right of self-determination); Thomas M. Franck,
Democracy and Legitmacy-Is There an Emerging Duty to Ensure a Democratic Government in
General and Regional Customary International Law?, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Joint
Conference Held in the Hague, The Netherlands (July 5, 1991), in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW ISSUES: SHARING PAN-EuROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 137 (1992); Jordan J. Paust,

InternationalLegal StandardsConcerning the Legitimacy of Governmental Power, 5 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 1063 (1990) (discussing the right of self-determination); Jordan J. Paust,
Democracy and Legitimacy-Is There an Emerging Duty to Ensure a Democratic Government in
General and Regional Customary International Law?, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Joint
Conference Held in the Hague, The Netherlands (July 5, 1991), in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW ISSUES: SHARING PAN-EUROPEAN

AND

AMERICAN

PERSPECTIVES

AND

AMERICAN

PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 126-30; Theo van Boven, Democracy and Legitimacy-Is There an
Emerging Duty to Ensure a Democratic Government in General and Regional Customary
International Law?, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Joint Conference Held in the Hague, The
Netherlands (July 5, 1991), in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: SHARING PANEUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 133-35.
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The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg offered another
important recognition relevant to notions of state authority or sovereignty.
When faced with a claim that those acting on behalf of, with the approval
of, or under orders of the state are immune from the reach of international
law, and that individuals are answerable only to the state, the Tribunal
rightly declared:
The principle of international law, which under certain
circumstances, protects the representatives of a state, cannot
be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by
international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter
themselves behind their official position ....[I]ndividuals
have international duties which transcend the national
obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state. He
who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while
acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in
authorizing action moves outside its competence under
international law.49
As the Tribunal affirmed, acts taken in violation of international law are
beyond the lawful authority of any state, are ultra vires, and cannot be
covered by claims to immunity.50 Indeed, sovereignty is conditioned on
In 1986, the International Court of Justice stated that "adherence by a State to any particular
doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law," confused "sovereignty"
with the "State" or "regime," and assumed nonsensically that a totalitarian dictatorship comports
with "freedom of choice." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 133
(June 27). Such statements are in serious error because the right of self-determination under the
United Nations Charter is not that of a "State" or a "regime" but that of a relevant people, and both
self-determination and human rights require a domestic political process based on the relative free
will of a given people.
49. Judgment and Sentences (Int'l Mil. Trib. (Nuremberg) 1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J.INT'L
L. 172, 221 (1947).
50. See Decision on Preliminary Motions paras. 26-34, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, IT-99-37-PT
(Int'l Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory ofthe Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (2001)) (ruling
that President Milosevic of Yugoslavia had no immunity from alleged international crimes as a head
of state and that Article 7 of the Statute of the ICTY, which rejects head of state immunity, "reflects
a rule of customary international law"); Judgement para. 140, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/I T (Int'l Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (1998))
(stating that state officials who commit torture are personally responsible for violating international
law); Judgement and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S (Int'l Trib. for Rwanda
1998) (sentencing the ex-Prime Minister for genocide and other crimes); Decision on the Defence
Motion on Jurisdiction para. 42, Prosecutor v. Tadic (Int'l Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (1995)) (stating that state officials who commit torture are
personally responsible for violating international law and that regarding "crimes which are universal
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in nature, ... the sovereign rights of States cannot and should not take precedence"); Report of the
Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 ofSecurity CouncilResolution 808, paras. 52-59 U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (1993), approvedby S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 6, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (stating that the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 should have jurisdiction to prosecute government officials,
including the head of state); Principles of InternationalLaw Recognized in the Charter of the
Nurnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal principles 1, III, adopted by G.A. Res.
177(11), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 111-12, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950) (stating that
"[any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible
therefor" and that "[t]he fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him
from responsibility under international law"); Judgment, Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Int'l Mil. Trib.
for the Far East (1948)), reprintedin PAUST ET AL., supra note 16, at 46-48; The High Command
Case (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948), in 11 TRIALSOFWARCRIMINALSBEFORETHENUERNBERGMILrrARY
TRIBUNALS 462, 489 (1950) ("International law operates as a restriction and limitation on the
sovereignty of nations ...[and] international obligations.., must be carried out even if to do so
violates a positive law or directive of state."); The Ministries Case (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1949), in 12,
13, 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MIL1TARY TRIBUNALS (1950-51)
(finding that diplomatic immunity applies to only legitimate acts of state and not violations of
international law). Also consider:
a)When a state is in breach ofjus cogens rules, it cannot bona fide expect that
it will be granted immunity ....
b) The acts of a state that violate jus cogens norms do not have the character
of sovereign acts. In such cases it is considered that the accused state did not act
within the ambit of its capacity as a sovereign.
c) Acts contrary to jus cogens norms are null and void, and cannot constitute
a source of legal rights or privileges, such as the claim to immunity ....
d) The recognition of immunity by a national court for an act that is contrary
to jus cogens would be tantamount to collaboration by that national court....
Ilias Bantekas, State Responsibilityin PrivateCivilAction-SovereignImmunity-ImmunityforJus
Cogens Violations-BelligerentOccupation-PeaceTreaties, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 765, 766 (1998)
(citing Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No. 137/1997 (Ct. of First
Instance of Leivadia 1997)).
In 2000, the Hellenic Supreme Court upheld the decision of nonimmunity granted in Prefecture
of Voiotia, noting that the murders in question were crimes against humanity and an abuse of
sovereign power that were not protectable acts under customary international law and that,. as acts
"'in breach of rules of peremptory international law..., they were not acts jure imperii' (i.e., they
were not lawful "public" acts and, as rationeultravires, they are unprotectable). Bernard H. Oxman
et al., Sovereign Immunity-Tort Exception-Jus Cogens Violations-World War 11
Reparations-International
HumanitarianLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 198, 198, 200 (2001) (quoting
Prefecture ofVoiotiav. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No. 11/2000 (Hellenic Sup. Ct. 2000));
see E. DE VATrEL, THE LAW OFNATIONS bk. 1, § 54 (special ed. 1993) (1758) ("The Prince ...who
seeks in his violence to deprive an innocent person of life, divests himself of his authority; by his
injustice and cruelty he becomes no more than an enemy, against whom it is allowed to defend
oneself."); PAUST, supra note 39, at 236, 422, 435-39; PAUST Er AL., supra note 16, at 27-34, 38,
42, 46-53, 55-70, 73-74, 88-99, 132, 134, 136, 171-73, 621-22 (describing the trials of Conradin
von Hohenstafen in 1268 and Peter von Hagenbach in 1474, who were executed for waging an
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obedience to international law, the law upon which sovereignty rests. The
false conflation of an autonomous state and raw power with sovereignty
has been a theoretic association convenient for those alleging the
permissibility of oppression of other peoples, or communist5 and other

unjust war and for engaging in the improper and terroristic administration of pledged territories,
respectively), 660, 677 (describing the trial of Radovan Karadzic for genocide in Bosnia and
Herzegovina), 699-708 (reprinting the indictments of Georges Rutaganda and Jean Paul Akayesu
for genocide committed in Rwanda), 717 (describing the detainment of Napoleon in 1810 for
waging wars against the peace of the world), 741-46 (reprinting the Report ofthe 1919 Commission
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties concerning the
German Emperor William II), 747 (reprinting Article 227 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany in
Versailles on June 28, 1919, which did "publicly arraign" the German Emperor William II), 821;
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searchingfor PeaceandAchieving Justice: The Needfor Accountability, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 17 (1996) (stating that states have the obligation to eliminate
immunities of superiors up to and including heads of state); Andrea Bianchi, Denying State
Immunity to Violators ofHuman Rights, 46 Aus. J.PUB. & INT'L L. 195 (1994); Yoram Dinstein,
InternationalCriminalLaw, 5 ISR. Y.B. ONHUM. Rrs. 55 (1975); L.C. Green, InternationalCrimes
and the Legal Process, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 567 (1980); MARTIN SCHEININ ET AL., INT'L LAW
ASS'N, FINALREPORTON THE EXERCISEOFUNIVERSALJURISDICTION IN RESPECTOFGROSS HUMAN

RIGHTS OFFENCES 13-14, 21, app. (2000) (discussing jurisdiction over human rights violations and
arguing that no government official should be immune from prosecution for human rights
violations), availableat http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Human/o20Rights/20Law/HumanRig.pdf(last
visited Sept. 26, 2004).
Nonimmunity for human rights violations has also been mandated in treaties. See, e.g., ICCPR,
supra note 8, at art. 2 para. 3(a) (stating that each party to the agreement has a duty to "ensure that
any person whose rights ...are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity"); American Convention on
Human Rights, supranote 48, at art. 25(l); Convention Against Torture andOther Cruel,Inhuman
or DegradingTreatment or Punishment,G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
197, arts. 1, 14, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (reciting a duty to ensure redress and "fair and adequate
compensation"); U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th Sess., General Comment No. 20 para. 2,
U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\REV. I at 30 (1994) (finding that states have a duty to protect against torture
"whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, [or] outside their official capacity");
id. at para. 13 ("[W]hether committed by public officials or other persons acting on behalf of the
State.... [t]hose who violate [the Convention Against Torture] ...must be held responsible.").
Moreover, every modern international criminal law instrument applies to any person or everyone
who commits a relevant crime, thus reaching any official as well as any private perpetrator. See,
e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 27(1) (adopted by U.N. Diplomatic
Conference July 17, 1998), reprintedin JORDANJ. PAUSTET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 206, 219 (2000).
51. See ALEXANDER DALLIN & GEORGE W. BRESLAUER, POLITICAL TERROR IN COMMUNIST
SYSTEMS (1970); HERBERT MARCUSE, SOVIET MARXISM 188-93, 198-99, 225-26, 245 (1958); G.

I. TUNKiN, THEORYOFINTERNATIONALLAW 82-83, 137,431,435-36,438 (William E. Butler trans.,
1974); cf id. at 382 ("The subjects of international legal responsibility are the subjects of
international law; consequently, they are above all, and primarily, states.... In isolated instances
there occurs responsibility of physical persons."); A. P. Movchan, The Human Rights Problem in
Present-Day International Law, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 233, 239 (Grigory
Tunkin ed. and G. Ivanov-Mumjiev trans., 1969) (quoting Lassa Oppenhelm) ("'[A]lthough such
treaties generally speak of rights which individuals shall have... , this is, as a rule, nothing more
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forms of internal and external oppression, and terrorism. 2 Opponents of
terrorism would do well to heed the consequences of such claims to control
in the name of the state, and claims to a world ordered by sovereign states.
In any event, deference to such claims is not necessary or desirable in
order to oppose nonstate actor terrorism. More generally, loyalty,
nationalism, and patriotism without tolerance and effective guarantees of
human rights can foster impermissible acts of nonstate terrorism.
Conversely, the promotion of tolerance and human rights can deflate or
defeat various forms of social violence and terrorism. Impermissible
terrorism necessarily violates human rights of both direct and indirect
victims that are of international concern whether engaged in by state or
nonstate actors.5 3 Thus, when human rights are protected, terrorism is set
back.

'The Soviet science of international law is unequivocal in its
than an inaccuracy of language ....
claim that the 'legal position of individuals is determined by national and not international law."');
G.I. Tunkin, Peaceful Coexistence and InternationalLaw, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra, at 5, 32 (describing "international law as an expression of state will"). Finally,
consider:
Sovereignty, [is] a particular feature of the state ....
The supremacy of the state means subordination to it of all persons and
organisations within the bounds of state territory.
The state has supreme power ....All these organisations and persons are
bound to submit to it.
...Only the will of the sovereign state, expressed in state power, becomes a
law ....

The very concept of state supremacy negates the possibility of formally
restricting state power. State power operates on the basis of the law and order it
itself creates.
N.A. Ushakov, InternationalLaw and Sovereignty, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra,at 97, 99-102.
52. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Positivismand Fidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart,71
HARv. L. REV. 630,658-59 (1958) (stating that positivist-trained German lawyers in the 1930s were
so "prepared to accept as 'law' anything that called itself by thatname, was printed at government
expense, and seemed to come 'von oben herab' that they were the first to fall in line and to support
Hitler's evil regime); Jordan J. Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a Better Understandingof
Content, Authority, and Choice, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 226, 268, 270-72, 274-77 (Fall 1980).
53. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 25,75 (1978) (recognizing
with respect to IRA actions that "terrorist activities ... of individuals of groups ...are in clear
disregard of human rights"); Paust, supranote 38, at 41-42. Concerning the reach of human rights
law to nonstate perpetrators, see generally Jordan J. Paust, The OtherSide of Right: PrivateDuties
Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 51 (1992) (discussing duties of private
individuals under international human rights law); supra note 42.
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These points compel recognition that the Bush Administration's refusal
to follow human rights law and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the
Administration's quest for a radically new unreviewable and unchecked
4
executive power with respect to persons detained without trial,1
interrogation of detainees,55 and prosecution of foreigners accused in ad
hoc military commissions,56 ultimately do not serve efforts to deflate and
defeat transnational terrorism. In some cases, such unlawful and unwise
practices can help to foster terrorist ambitions, and they can lead to a
general degradation of respect for our government and its influence in the
international community. Of course, one should not confuse loyalty to the
present Administration with loyalty to this country and to venerable
American values, nationalism, or patriotism. This is especially evident
when one realizes that human rights have formed the core of our
constitutional values since America's founding57 and that, as the Founders
and Framers knew, the federal judiciary must play its necessary role in
checking presidential violations of human rights and other violations of
international law.58

54. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, JudicialPower to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 503-04 (2003) [hereinafter Judicial Power];
Jordan J. Paust, After 9/11, "No Neutral Ground"with Respect to Human Rights: Executive Claims
andActions ofSpecialConcernandInternationalLaw Regardingthe DisappearanceofDetainees,
50 WAYNE L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
55. See, e.g., Paust, JudicialPower,supra note 54, at 504 n.4, 529-31; supra note 9.
56. See, e.g., Jordan J.Paust, AntiterrorismMilitaryCommissions: The Ad Hoc DODRules
of Procedure,23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677, 678-93 (2002); Jordan J.Paust, Antiterrorism Military
Commissions: CourtingIllegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2001).
57. See, e.g., PAUST, supranote 39, at 195-203, 208-10, 323-26, 329-33.
58. See, e.g., id. at 7-11, 169-73, 179,489-95; Paust, JudicialPower, supranote 54; Harold
Honju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policyfor the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293,
335-36 (2002).
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